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Davis's admirable text on administrative law was published by West in
the early fall of 1951. Its preface is dated April 1951 and both text and
documentation are up to that date. It has 1024 pages, a good bibliography,
and a list of about 2,000 cases. It costs $8. The present volume, on the other
hand, was published by the same publisher late in 1952 with a preface dated
October 1952. But, as stated above, its coverage does not go beyond Septem-
ber 1950.6 It has 518 pages, three separate indexes which make it hard to
look up anything, no bibliography (hardly any writings, except official ma-
terials, of a date later than 1930 are cited anywhere), and it uses but 170 cases,
The book costs $12. Why did a publisher of West's reputation put it out?
REGINALD PARKERt
WARUM WURDE KRUPP VERURTEILT? By Tilo Freiherr von Wilmowsky.
Stuttgart: Friedrich Vorwerk Verlag, 1950. Pp. 224. Din. 7.80.
THE current revival of West German industry under traditional German
industrial leadership gives timeliness to a German defense of the Krupp in-
dustrial empire, published as early as 1950.
In 1948, the Krupp leadership was imprisoned and stripped of its industrial
assets upon conviction on charges of spoliation and mistreatment of slave-
labor.' In 1951 both Krupp men and Krupp fortunes were released by ex-
ecutive fiat :2 a United States High Commissioner voided the judgment of a
military tribunal of American judges.3
6. Thus the book fails to include the rulings of the Supreme Court in such recent
administrative-legal landmarks as Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1951) ; NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 498 (1951); Riss & Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 907 (1951). It also fails to discuss administrative aspects of the Internal Security
Act and of the McCarran Immigration Act.
tProfessor of Law, Willamette University.
1. See 9 TaiALs OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MImTARY TRIUNALS
1449-54 (1950) (hereinafter cited as TuIALs OF WAR CRIMUNALS). Deprivation of stolen
property was specifically authorized by the original Nuremberg Charter. CuAuRm OF
INTERNATiONAL M=LIARY TiunuxAL, art. 28. A more general property forfeiture was
authorized under the inter-Allied Control Council Law No. 10, art. II, § 3, which governed
the subsequent proceedings.
2. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1951, p. 1, col. 2.
3. Krupp's reprieve cannot be viewed as an isolated phenomenon in Germany under
Allied auspices. "The very men who were the core of the cartel movement in Germany
were the ones who brought Hitler to power. Now this same group of men has been re-
turned to power. They have picked up where they left off." Testimony of J. S. Martin,
former special.assistant to the Attorney General, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Study of Monwpoly Power of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess,,
Serial 14, Pt. 4A, 406 (1950). The composition of the present German management of
the iron and steel industries in the American and British zones is "scarcely distinguish-
able from the old Stahlwerks-Verband." Ibid.
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The initial conviction had evoked no widespread misgivings in the West.
The amnesty, however, was accompanied by overwhelming British and French
condemnation,4 scattered expressions of misgivings which were muffled in
the prevailing political climate in the United States,0 and "victory" celebrations
in Germany.
6
Wi arn Wurde Krupp Verurteilt?, written by Tilo Freiherr von Wilmow-
sky, a Krupp relative and a one-time executive in Krupp's industries, who
himself escaped prosecution by a hair's breadth,7 epitomizes German industrial
propaganda between Krupp's conviction and release.
Ii
The book is clearly designed to help in the rehabilitation of German industry
in Western eyes. It renders yeoman's service in this phase of German propa-
ganda and deserves study, if only for that reason.8 It is a tribute to the
author's propagandistic skill that the entire pattern of his presentation should
cater to the vagaries of the American scene.
The technique is carefully adapted to the character of the target area. Guilt
is sown for Krupp's imprisonment by the literary creation of the prisoner in
the image of a business respectability,9 whose aura has been known to deter
United States judges from ordering the imprisonment of otherwise respect-
able antitrust violators.10 A further foundation for the immunity of the busi-
nessman from criminal prosecution is laid by ascribing wholesale political im-
potence to business,11 preferably on a universal basis, but for this case, at least
in the framework of the totalitarian state. The armor prepared for Krupp is
then made impregnable by propounding the credo that a contrary assumption,
ascribing large-scale political significance to the wealth function, constitutes
the product of Marxist-Leninist indoctrination.
4. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1951, p. 5, col. 3; id., March 10, 1951, p. 3, col. 8; 'the
World Today, Oct., 1952, p. 409.
5. Compare H.R. REP. No. 1456, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1952), uith the attitude
expressed by Senator Joseph McCarthy in welcoming another aspect of the e-ecutive
action of mass clemency which included the Krupp release. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1951,
p. 7, col. 2.
6. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1951, p. 8, col. 2 (champagne breakfast and recep-
tion for Krupp after release).
7. Pp. 7-8. See, also, reproductions of a letter from Gustav Krupp, defendant's father
and predecessor in office, to von Wilmowsky, "concerning necessary future collaboration
with the Nazi Party by Defendant Loeser in event he became a Krupp official," and of
a letter from von Wilmowsky to Gustav Krupp concerning a prospective conference be-
tveen Hitler and Gustav Krupp, 9 TMALs oF WA CR=msIaLS, 347-8, 469.
8. A similar propaganda offensive in behalf of German industry was initiated after
the conclusion of World War I. See, e.g., Dn GnurTEan, ZuZs Rugnp t=uct (1923);
KEssUn, GEPxtANy um EURoPE (1923).
9. Pp. 29-33.
10. See DEssior, CRIMItNAL LAW, ADMN1S TRAIs4o AiT Punuc Ort-= 23 (1949).
11. Pp. 36-40. For a discussion of similar arguments in the United States on the
political impotence of business, see ARNoLD, Tam FOLzLoRE OF CAprTAusi4 193 (1937).
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In such a context, Mr. Justice Jackson's view of the Krupp enterprise as
"the focus, the symbol, and the beneficiary of the most sinister forces engaged
in menacing the peace of Europe' n 2 can be damned as an example of com-
munist economic analysis and the Krupp prosecution itself as indistinguishable
from communist subversion of the capitalist structure of the Western world.' 8
It is obvious that the main point of attack selected by the author is the
"morality" of the infliction of criminal sanctions for business practices which
by no stretch of the imagination can be made to resemble familiar patterns of
customary crime.
The timing of the propaganda thrust appears equally felicitous. The issue
posed is that of the status accorded to the exercise of ecopolitical power. 14
The answer, at least in the Western World, has heretofore been furnished
in the increasing imposition of civil and criminal responsibility upon individual
and group in the activities of the commercial enterprise.10 It has thus become
elementary to assume the capacity of business investment to contribute to
national power and conversely the capacity of national power to contribute to
business investment.'0 The trend of decision has shown clear-cut recognition
of the power function of the business unit and has enforced its social respon-
sibilities, not infrequently through the use of criminal sanctions.11
The issue concerning the status of contemporary ecopolitical power, how-
ever, is significantly posed by von Wilmowsky at a time of increased restive-
ness against public restrictions of private ecopolitical power in the United
States.' 8 The Krupp advocacy commands therefore a more respectful hear-
ing than ever, sometimes from unexpected quarters. 19
The United States response to continued German pressure highlighted by
Tilo Freiherr von Wilmowsky's book, serves to raise the question whether
12. 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRImiNALS, INT'L MILiTARY TRIBuNAL 134 (1947).
13. Pp. 36-40.
14. The term "ecopolitical" is attributable to LASSWELL & KAPLAN, PowMt AND
Socmry 90-1 (1950): "Control over power on the basis of wealth is ecopolitical (eco-
nomic-political) power exemplified in the purchase of votes or office."
15. See Comment, Fifty Years of Sherman Act Enforcenent, 49 YALE L.J. 284
(1939) ; Note, Aspects of Criminal Restraints on Acquisitive Conduct, 38 COL. L. REv.
624 (1938).
16. Classic recognition of such interdependences has been accorded by such presum-
ably non-Marxist publications as papal encyclicals. See, e.g., ENCyCLICAL LFaTn oF His
HOLINEss, POPE Plus XI, QUADRA;Esi-iO ANNO (National Catholic Welfare Conference
ed. 1935).
17. See, e.g., REP. Arr'y GEN. (1950); id. (1938).
18. See, e.g., the Republican Party campaign platform for 1952, N.Y. Times, July
11, 1952, p. 8, and discussion of the National Association of Manufacturers' demands for
business immunity from public control in ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE Or CAPITALIsm 71
et seq. (1937).
19. See, e.g., Kronstein, Book Review, 53 COL. L. Rv. 139, 143 (1953). Professor
Kronstein's present position appears in strange contrast to his earlier attitude. Kronsteiz
& Leighton, Cartel Control: A Record of Failure, 55 YAlE L.J. 297, 334 (1946).
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the trend toward the increased enforcement of the social responsibilities of
private power units has been reversed under the impact of recent policy
developments. It seems plain that the author's appeal for the German indus-
trialists is addressed with particular urgency to the business interests, familiar
with the embarrassment of the enforcement of public control measures through
criminal and other sanctions in the United States.20 This reviewer suggests
that the changing complexion of the United States' political elite has endowed
such appeals with a compelling quality which might not have been encountered
in the past. It seems strangely coincidental that Krupp's ultimate immuni-
zation from criminal sanctions in post-war Germany should be paralleled by
the increasing business immunizations through lack of effective antitrust
prosecutions in the post-war United States.2 '
III
The first part of von Wilmowsky's work embodies a panegyric on the lives
and fortunes of generations of Krupps. To all intents and purposes, religion
and business seem indistinguishable under the Krupp manage, depicted as
dominated by such Krupp dicta as: "morality and rectitude must animate all
our activities.
'22
The Krupp family's sense of "morality" and "rectitude" was expressed,
according to the author, in ethical business practices, widespread philanthropy
and political neutrality. Illustrations are provided in short order. We are
told of the Krupp record of flawless productivity for peaceful use,3 Krupp
investments in housing developments for their workers,2 and the "correct-
ness" of Krupp loyalty to every national government.2 5 Quite ingenuously,
the author bases his "finding" of Krupp's political neutrality on the "impar-
tiality" with which Krupp armaments were put at the service of all German
governments indifferently. Specific business policies, in such a conte-t, he
assures us, were dictated in each case by the "categorical imperative" of obedi-
20. See REPsr, NATIONAL Co NEaLENCE ON THE RELATION OF LAw An, Busxxuss
(1st Sess. 1931) (specific emphasis on the antitrust laws). For a treatment of American-
German cartel arrangements, see STOCKING & ,VATKINS, CAmsLs I ACTIo N (194S).
21. See Levi, Tle Anti-Trust Lc',s & Monopoly, 14 U. or CH. L. REv. 153, 1S3
(1947).
"The Inter-national Steel Cartel carried out openly for over 10 years, and its com-
ponent parts are now carrying out covertly, a policy which can only be described as the
diametric opposite of the Marshall plan and of President Truman's point 4. Powerful
American firms participated in that effort to stifle and control economic development, and
these same firms are now participating in the establishment of the same kind of unofficial
economic foreign policy for the United States while our Government is trying to move
in the opposite direction. In doing so these American firms are violating the antitrust
laws... ." Hearings, spra note 3, at 359.
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ence to national authority.26 Subject to all of the duties of German citizen-
ship, the Krupps are pictured as inexorably accepting governmental orders
under both physical and moral constraint 2 7 Presented in this light the Krupps
seem deliberately miscast for the role of war criminals.
It is in the expectation of facing an increasing number of sympathetic lis-
teners that the Baron delivers himself of the second part of his disquisition.
This is devoted to the issues posed by the trial itself. Here he proceeds to
attack the substantive law, the procedure and the sufficiency of proof,
While admitting Krupp's use of the slave labor and foreign industries seized
by Nazi conquest,28 the author nevertheless maintains that Krupp's innocence
is as white as snow. In his view, conviction is barred by the defense of neces-
sity.2 9 The necessity is defined as that of a war emergency which constrained
the Krupp industry to avail itself of varying forms of slave labor and foreign
industrial machinery according to the dictates of an all-powerful State:
"There was no more escape from this pattern of governmental coer-
cion for the entrepreneur than for the laborer."80
Krupp enterprises are thus made to appear puny in the path of the Leviathan.
Business management disclaims any significant effect upon government.
Beyond this, the following defects, among others, are ascribed to the sub-
stantive law governing the counts of the indictment for which convictions
were procured. The Baron declares, for example, that the spoliation count,
charging the Krupp defendants with the plunder of occupied territory lacked
substantive force: the court failed to recognize that technological advances
in a "total war" required the granting of greater latitude to the permissible
scope of belligerent operations and that therefore what may well be "plunder"
in the nineteenth century may constitute a legitimate form of economic war-
fare in the twentieth. 31 He declares further that the count on the exploitation
of forced labor included elements of ex post facto legislation because the Rules
of War laid down by the Hague Convention did not explicitly proscribe the
mere use as forced labor of civilian populations of, conquered countries.
8 2
On procedural grounds, the author charges violations of basic decencies at
the expense of the defense, such as the indefinite detention of defendants before
trial without benefit of habeas corpus, 33 inclusion of evidence in the trial record
26. Pp. 25-9. Drew Middleton commented perceptively: "The Krupp family has
maintained a democratic attitude toward money--they will take it from anyone.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1951, § 6, p. 24. -
27. Pp. 29-32.
28. Pp. 90-196.
29. Pp. 143, 145, 166-8.






through the use of judicial notice,M hearing of witnesses in the absence of
defendants' counsel,35 and an unseemly haste in the trial of the case. °
He complains as well of the insufficiency of proof on both spoliation and
slave labor counts. His complaint is general. Isolated instances of mistreat-
ment, for example, he suggests should not be allowed to give rise to the con-
clusion of a pattern.3 7 Rarely does he attack testimony directly. When he
does, his illustrations of evidentiary insufficiency appear odd indeed. Thus
he peremptorily designates as "senseless" an Hungarian Jewess' eye-vitness
account of physical brutalities perpetrated by supervisors in Krupp indus-
tries.3 s One wonders why.
It is hardly surprising that the conclusion which the author urges on his
reader is that a gross miscarriage of justice has taken place on all scores.
IV
Von Wilmowsky's assertion concerning Krupp's political neutrality is belied
by the facts. The Krupps had made public boast of their circumvention of
the Treaty of Versailles' armaments restrictions after World War IU39 Afried
Krupp became a sponsoring member of the SS in 1931:10 The Krupps fur-
nished vital and enthusiastic financial backing for Hitler since early 1933.41
The dividends in war contracts for the Third Reich had come thick and fast.
Prizes multiplied in the war years.4e Thus, for example, the Krupp concern
acquired Jewish property-seized forcibly for the use of German appointed
"administrators" 3-and dismantled French plants for shipment to Germany.4
It made frequent and insistent application for allocation of forced labor to its
enterprises. 45 It established penal camps for the refractory,4  maintained a
bare subsistence level for its foreign labor,47 and stressed the need for the






39. "At the time 11919] the situation appeared almost hopeless.... I wanted to and
had to maintain Krupp, in spite of all opposition, as an armament plant. ... Vithout
arousing any commotion, the necessary measures and preparations were undertahm ...
Even the Allied snooping commissions were duped." See 9 TRLLs OF ,VAP, Cwnum:,Ls
263-4 (extract from article written by Gustav Krupp in 1942).
40. Id. at 37.
41. See reproduction of documentary evidence from Krupp files concerning the Krupp
leadership in organizing industrialist support for Hitler in 1933. Id. at 33S-45.
42. The record establishes the unmistakmble Krupp effort to effect large-scale busi-
ness expansion for profit during the var years. See, e.g., id. at 491.
43. See, e.g., id. at 506-12.
44. Id. at 632-5.
45. Id. at 637-9, 713-5, 730-1, 740, 1132-4, 1137-9, 1161-2, 1211.
46. Id. at 1031-9.
47. Id. at 874-5, 905, 1109-11, 1147.
48. Id. at 885-92.
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The independence of Krupp action was maintained in both Nazi victory
and disaster. When it suited their purpose the Krupps gave freely of their
effort to the Nazi cause. Nazi victory saw the Krupps as a mainstay of Nazi
power. Dramatic proof of the interaction of Nazi power and industrial prac-
tices was furnished by a prosecution witness who had visited the Krupps at
their home during a radio broadcast which was reporting on the German
military offensive in the West in 1940:
"[T] here must have been some news which was to the effect that in
Holland the situation had so consolidated that there was a possi-
bility that outstanding members of the economy would be able to
travel there ... the tension of these gentlemen grew perceptibly;..
and now the ... gentlemen ... pointed to certain places in Holland
... One said, . . . 'Here is village B; there is Mueller; he is yours,
and there is Mr. Schmidt, or Huber, or somebody, he has two
plants, well, we will have him arrested', and so it went on .. .the
executives and the factory owners were mentioned by name and from
the fact that it was said, 'this one is yours, that one is yours, that one
we will have arrested-he has two factories,' from that I had to
conclude that these were industrial installations and some sort of in-
dustrial plants."
49
When it suited their purpose at other times the Krupps, just as freely,
withheld their support from their government. Nazi disaster saw the Krupps
reducing their financial contributions to the war effort in violation of the
then existing law. As explicitly admitted by a defense witness, Krupp officials
had no sooner sensed the impending German defeat than they sought the
perpetuation of the Krupp financial power beyond the war years in defiance
of Nazi authority. As early as 1943, incurring the technical risk of concen-
tration camp internment or worse, the Krupp management embarked upon a
policy of gradual but systematic sale of German government bonds worth 200
million Reichsmarks. German government bonds worth only 68 million marks
remained unsold by the Krupps by the end of the war.60
It is difficult, under these circumstances, to retain an impression of the
Krupps as the impotent playthings of an all-powerful State.
The cavils at the substantive law, procedure and sufficiency of proof do not
fare any better under examination.
The defense of "necessity" is patently inapplicable to the facts of the case
under both Civil and Common Law.51
In the matter of spoliation, it suffices to note the unique area within which
von Wilmowsky endows the tribunal with the right of judicial legislation. He
49. Id. at 500.
50. Testimony of defense witness Schroeder, id. at 870-3. See particularly this wit-
ness's responses to questions by Judge Anderson. Id. at 872-3.
51. The defense of necessity was rejected by the tribunal, id. at 1445. See HALL,




demands judicial innovation which would allow human destructiveness, and
denies innovation which would curtail this destructiveness. It is thus that a
defense formulation of a new concept of "spoliation" is welcomed and a prose-
cution formulation of a new concept of "aggressive war" is spurned. 2
His protest that the finding of guilt for the exploitation of forced labor is
vitiated by retroactivity is not based on fact. The Rules of the Hague Con-
vention were explicit.53 They had been effectively sustained against similar
attack, before the Krupp trial, in the analysis furnished in the judgment of the
International Military Tribunal in the proceedings against Goering et al'
What about the procedural objections raised by von Wilmowsky? A point
by point rebuttal of the Baron's charges has been effectively provided by
Telford Taylor, U.S. Chief of Counsel for War Crimes at the time of the
Krupp case.5 5 One is startled by the arrogance and dishonesty of some of
von Wilmowsky's allegations. It seems strange to hear the author's insistence on
habeas corpus for the benefit of the Nazi elite when this process was unknown
in Germany throughout the Hitler regime. The length of the trial (from
December 8, 1947 to June 30, 1948) provides the best answer to the charge
of haste. The scope of affidavit evidence was not without legal precedent in
continental Western Europe,56 and was, as stated by Telford Taylor, exploited
far more widely by the defense than the prosecution. 1 The inclusion of
evidence in the trial record through the use of judicial notice, could not, if
American experience has any significancer s be said to have worked to the
disadvantage of the defendants in this case. No evidence appears in the record
of any hearing of witnesses in the absence of defendants' counsel, as charged
by von Wilmowsky. Telford Taylor states that he knows of "no basis" for
such a charge.59 The reader has his choice of believing the record and Telford
Taylor or Tilo Freiherr von Wilmowsky.
Complaints concerning an insufficiency of credible evidence appear specious,
in that even defense witnesses confirmed prosecution claims,c0 and incriminat-
ing documents from Krupp's files provided the major basis of decision. 6 ' The
52. Pp. 77-9, 92-102.
53. See Hague Regulations of Land Warfare, articles 46-56 of Annex to Hague
Convention IV, Oct. 13, 1907, 36 STAT. 2277, 2306 (1909). See also Kuxz, KnRIEsmcnT
UND NEu TALiTATsREcnT 75 (1935).
54. 22 THE TRiAL OF GERIAN MAJOR VAR CRIAUNALS, INx'L MU.IARY Trnmum.A
460-3 (1949).
55. Taylor, The Krupp Trial: Fact z,. Fiction, 53 COL L REv. 197 (1953).
56. See DoxNEnrEu DE VABRaS, TRAITL DE Daorr CSnnmM r Dr LEzISLATI0.-
P~xALE ComAPPIRE, 793 (Paris 1947).
57. Taylor, The Krupp Trial: Fact v. Fiction, 53 Co. L REv. 197, 204 (1953).
58. See Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact: II, 58
YALE L.J. 1242, 1248-50 (1949).
59. Taylor, The Krupp Trial: Fact v. Fiction, 53 Co. L REv. 197, 205 (1953).
60. See 9 TRiALs OF WAR CPnmu ALs 1135-7 (1950).
61. See Opinion and Judgment of Military Tribunal, 9 TALs Or F CVAP r.iALs
1327-1449 (1950).
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correlation between the Baron's assertions and the facts of the situation ap-
pears negligible.
V
It is characteristic of the trend of the times that the carefully worded judg-
ment which was handed down by the American judges in the Krupp Case
should weigh less heavily with an American High Commissioner than the
arguments of the type propounded by the Baron.
There, by grace of one branch of American government, goes Alfried
Krupp, returning to the management of the industry he loved so well, as
mindless of politics as ever.
0 2
Somewhat uneasily this reviewer cannot help remembering the munitions
maker, portrayed by George Bernard Shaw, who exclaimed:
"Government of your country! Be off with you, my boy, and play
with your caucuses and leading articles and historic parties and
great leaders and burning questions and the rest of your toys. I am
going back to my counting-house to pay the piper and call the
tune."63
RiCHARD ARENSt
62. A recent agreement with the Western powers under which Krupp is pledged to
sell his holdings in the coal, iron and steel industries by a certain date, in return for which
the Allies will lift all remaining controls on his other industrial enterprises, is unlikely
to change the present picture. It is significant that the full operative effect of the agree-
ment is explicitly deferred until 1960. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1953, p. 1, col. 5. There is
a dearth of German enterprises with the available financial resources to effect a purchase,
Wall Street Journal, Sept. 25, 1952, p. 8, col. 4. And, even if any sale were consummated,
Krupp would retain obvious financial power to buy his way back.
63. Act III, Major Barbara, THE WORKS OF BERNARD SHAW 321 (1930).
tMember, District of Columbia Bar.
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